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Relationship of Auditing Standards 
To Detection of Fraud 
George R. Catlett 
Arthur Andersen & Co. 
The accounting profession is facing a wide diversity of difficult challenges. 
One of the current problems facing C P A s i n public practice is how to achieve a 
proper understanding on the part of the public and others of 1) the relation-
ship of auditing standards to the detection of fraud, and 2) the responsibilities 
of auditors for the detection of fraud. 
Nature of Fraud 
Dishonesty and deceit have always been present to some degree not only 
i n the business community but i n all walks of life. However, fraud i n business 
enterprises has been increasing i n recent years. Whi le most managements and 
employees are honest, there are enough material cases of dishonesty to cause 
concern among independent auditors. 
Fifteen years ago, most accounting firms had only an occasional fraud case, 
and many of those were not of any great significance. Today, with fraud cases 
becoming more common, and with investigations by governmental agencies and 
resulting litigation exploding i n all directions, this disturbing trend is becoming 
a major factor in the operation of accounting firms. Some of the reasons for 
this situation are interesting, but time limitations do not permit us to discuss 
that topic. 
What constitutes fraud is not always clear. In cases of bankruptcies and 
failures, fraud is sometimes alleged when what really may have occurred was 
bad management decisions and/or adverse business conditions, with a resulting 
loss of money by investors and creditors. The tendency to allege " fraud" under 
these circumstances frequently seems to be irresistible. In any event, what is 
referred to as " f raud" i n some cases may not actually be " fraud." 
Legal liability of independent auditors for alleged negligence and other 
deficiencies i n their work has many ramifications. M r . A . A . Sommer, Jr., now 
a Commissioner of the S E C , discussed this area at the Symposium here i n 1972. 
The number of court cases involving the question of whether and under what 
circumstances an auditor may have legal liability is still somewhat limited; but 
more such cases w i l l probably go to trial i n the next few years, and the guide-
lines may become clearer than they are at the present time. 
Many different kinds and magnitudes of fraud exist, with some not affecting 
the financial statements at all or only i n a minor way, while others have a 
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material effect on the financial statements. Some examples of the various types 
of fraud are: 
1. Misappropriation of assets. 
2. Overstatement of assets or understatement of liabilities to present 
more favorable financial position and/or results of operations. 
3. Siphoning off of assets through transactions wi th affiliated entities 
or i n other ways. 
4. "Kickbacks" and other irregular transactions between officers or 
employees of an enterprise and outside parties. 
5. Lack of disclosure of significant information. 
Fraud i n a business entity may be covered up in many ways, but major 
cases usually include collusion among officers and/or employees, or collusion 
with outside persons. The cover-up may involve false accounting entries or mis-
leading information, forgeries, unrecorded transactions, or other such means. 
Responsibilities of Management 
Management has the primary responsiblity for the use and safeguarding 
of corporate assets and the incurrence of liabilities of the business enterprise on 
behalf of the stockholders. A n additional responsibility runs to creditors and 
other parties and agencies wi th a legitimate interest in the enterprise. 
The responsibilities of the board of directors in monitoring the management 
are becoming of increasing concern to many directors, particularly the outside 
directors. Even though the directors, as representatives of the stockholders, 
review or approve management actions in various ways, the responsibilities of 
directors for various kinds of management fraud are still somewhat undefined 
from a legal standpoint. 
One of the important functions of management is the establishment of an 
adequate accounting system along with appropriate administrative and internal 
accounting controls and the necessary internal auditing. The resulting financial 
statements are the direct representations of management, setting forth the finan-
cial position and results of operations of the enterprise along with the necessary 
disclosures for interpretation of the financial statements. 
Primary reliance for the prevention and detection of fraud should be placed 
on an adequate system of internal control because such a system is in constant 
operation and covers a great many periods and transactions when the inde-
pendent auditor is not present. It is not feasible for the auditor to check these 
transactions later in any detail. Management should realize that a good system 
of internal control can be circumvented by collusion among employees or by 
collusion between one or more employees and persons outside the enterprise. 
This possibility must be considered by management, and internal auditing is an 
additional safeguard. 
When collusion to circumvent the accounting system is directed by man-
agement, an additional and complicating dimension is added to the problem 
of deciding when and how an auditor might detect fraud, assuming that gen-
erally accepted auditing standards have been followed. 
Managements involved in some fraud cases have been held legally responsi-
ble from a civi l and/or criminal standpoint. However, the number of cases is 
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disturbing i n which the independent auditor appears to be the main "target" i n 
governmental investigations and class action suits rather than the individuals 
who perpetrated the fraud. 
Present Auditing Standards 
What effect, i f any, should recent fraud cases and the resulting governmental 
investigations and litigation have on auditing standards? Are the present stand-
ards satisfactory? Have we learned as much as we should have from our 
experiences? Have the fraud situations gone undetected by auditors because of 
ineffective work or inadequate auditing standards; or has the cause been 
fraudulent concealment by management or other actions not detectable by nor-
mally appropriate auditing procedures? The answers to these and many other 
related questions are not self-evident. 
The auditor should constantly exercise his professional judgment i n deciding 
whether it is reasonable to assume that he has all the pertinent facts and what 
auditing standards and procedures are necessary in attempting to obtain the 
facts. Audi t ing cannot be done entirely by rules and forms. 
The greater use of electronic computers and all sorts of sophisticated equip-
ment for accounting and related purposes also represents new challenges i n 
developing audit techniques. Some of the basic concepts of auditing may be 
changed. However, the standards of auditing should not be thwarted by 
equipment. People, not machines, commit fraud. 
The A I C P A has a special committee reviewing the Equity Funding case 
to determine whether in the light of that case consideration should be given by 
the A I C P A to possible changes i n any auditing standards and procedures. The 
report of that committee has not been issued. 
The most authoritative statement by the A I C P A of the independent audi-
tor's responsibility for the detection of fraud is set forth in Statement on Audi t ing 
Standards N o . 1 (paragraphs 110.05-110.08), and this is quoted in Appendix A . 
Chapter 6, "Due Audi t Care," from The Philosophy of Auditing by Mautz 
and Sharaf, contains this statement: "Independent auditors should accept re-
sponsibility for the discovery and disclosure of those irregularities which the 
exercise of due audit care by a prudent practitioner would normally uncover." 
A summary of some of the views expressed i n that chapter is quoted i n A p -
pendix B. 
The membership of the A I C P A adopted ten standards that are referred to 
as "generally accepted auditing standards," and these are classified as general 
standards, standards of field work, and standards of reporting. These standards 
contain such requirements as technical training and proficiency, independence, 
due professional care, adequate planning, proper study and evaluation of internal 
control, and sufficient competent evidential matter. Careful distinction should 
be drawn between these "auditing standards" and the "auditing procedures" to 
be selected and executed in accordance with the standards. 
A l l of the items referred to above are wel l written and pertinent to the 
subject under discussion. W h e n we relate what is said i n those documents to 
the situation i n which the accounting profession finds itself today, it is evident 
that controversial questions and misunderstandings exist. 
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Internal Control 
Internal control, for many reasons, has become an increasingly important 
factor in the conduct of audits. The A I C P A second standard of field work 
states: "There is to be a proper study and evaluation of the existing internal 
control as a basis for reliance thereon and for the determination of the resultant 
extent of the tests to which auditing procedures are to be restricted." 
The evolution in auditing over many years i n the direction of greater reliance 
on internal controls and the use of test-checking in reviewing those controls is 
not just a theoretical or philosophical development. This trend is the result of 
practical necessity. W i t h the large business enterprises that now exist, detailed 
auditing to any significant extent is not economically feasible. 
When there are millions of transactions i n a single enterprise i n a year, an 
auditor must rely on test-checks for much of his work. Therefore, the effective-
ness of the accounting system and internal controls and the integrity of manage-
ment are crucial to the auditor. 
Most of the significant fraud cases publicized i n the financial press are the 
result of a breakdown i n internal control as a result of management direction, 
collusion of officers and/or employees, deterioration of internal control from 
neglect, or a combination of these and similar factors. 
The auditor's evaluation of internal control is an important phase of an 
audit engagement. Management has a responsibility to its shareholders to see 
that adequate internal control exists. A n absence of adequate control raises a 
serious question; one to which professional judgment must be applied as to 
whether the auditor can compensate by expanding the scope of his work or 
should withdraw from the engagement. 
Representations by Clients 
Representations by management and employees take many forms in the 
conduct of an audit. If an auditor is precluded from relying on such representa-
tions and should be required to assume that al l of them are wrong until he can 
prove them correct, an audit would have to be viewed from a vastly different 
perspective. A n auditor certainly does not accept all information and data 
given to h im by a client without question. O n the other hand, when an auditor 
is given misinformation or information is withheld without his knowledge, 
there are limits to the steps he should be expected to take to find something he 
does not know exists. If each audit is to be approached with the viewpoint that 
the client is dishonest until proven otherwise, not only would an entirely new 
approach be needed but also the auditor may well be placed i n an untenable 
position. 
The credibility and integrity of management are an important factor for 
an auditor to assess in the conduct of his work. If the auditor finds that a man-
agement does not have sufficient integrity to rely on its representations, he is 
running a serious risk that frequently cannot adequately be dealt with by an 
extension or expansion of the audit procedures. O n the other hand, an auditor 
may assume that integrity exists and then find to his dismay that his trust and 
confidence i n this regard were misplaced. 
Auditors do have responsibilities i n the conduct of an audit, but these 
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responsibilities do not include infallibility or clairvoyance. Management should 
be held responsible for misrepresentations and withholding of material matters 
from the auditor. A n auditor should not be held responsible when he follows 
customary auditing procedures, those procedures do not disclose the deception, 
and no apparent reason exists to expand the customary audit procedures. 
What are Some of the Pertinent Questions? 
A few pertinent questions regarding auditing standards and procedures 
as they relate to the detection of fraud are set forth below i n order to serve as a 
basis for discussion. 
The first question is: Should an unqualified auditor's opinion be construed 
to constitute a representation that there is no undetected fraud having a material 
effect on the financial statements? 
A second and somewhat related question is: Should an auditor be held to 
be a "guarantor" of the financial statements or of the fairness with which they 
are presented insofar as fraud is concerned? Put another way, should the auditor 
be held to have a joint responsibility with the management for the financial 
statements i n this regard? 
The third question is: Can fraud become so extensive or massive that the 
answers to the first two questions are different? 
A fourth question, especially i f the first two are answered affirmatively, is: 
Are any basic changes needed in current auditing standards and procedures? 
A fifth question is: Should auditors rate clients as to quality and take only 
the better ones? If so, what are the criteria for this purpose? 
A further question is: Should legislation be passed establishing greater 
responsibility on the part of everyone not to intentially mislead auditors? 
I w i l l not try as a part of my formal remarks to answer these questions in 
detail, but I w i l l make a few comments on them. 
Hindsight is a wonderful faculty. There is no area in which hindsight is 
more readily applied than to undetected fraud after such fraud is later discovered. 
It inevitably seems to appear obvious that the fraud should have been detected. 
The circumstances at the time are most difficult to recreate and comprehend, and 
little effort is really made to do so. Second-guessing becomes prevalent, and 
the less experience or knowledge one has about auditing, the more certain one 
becomes of the righteousness of his condemnation. Subsequently judging the 
effectiveness of a professional person in doing his work under the stress and 
strain and actual conditions at the time should not be taken lightly. 
Auditors should not be presumed to have represented or guaranteed that 
no undetected fraud exists or to have guaranteed that the financial statements 
are a fair presentation of the financial position and results of operations. Those 
who suggest that the auditor has a joint, and presumably equal, responsibility 
with management for the financial statements do not i n my view understand 
the relative roles of management and the auditor. There is no more justification 
for an auditor to be a guarantor than there would be for a lawyer to guarantee 
that he w i l l w i n a lawsuit or a doctor to guarantee that an operation w i l l be 
successful. A lawyer does not have a joint responsibility for a client's morals, 
and a doctor does not have a joint responsibility for a patient's health habits. 
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Insofar as the extent or massiveness of a fraud is concerned, about all to be 
said about this is that the larger the fraud the more likely it is to be detected 
by the auditor i n following proper audit procedures. However, counter forces 
to detection may be the extent of the collusion inside and outside of the enter-
prise, the existence of expert forgery, or other sophisticated deterrents to detection. 
Generally accepted auditing standards and procedures should be constantly 
reevaluated i n the light of improved knowledge and current developments. This 
should be done by the accounting profession and by accounting firms. A s an 
example, some of our past ideas i n this regard may be changed by computers. 
Some improvements can undoubtedly be made i n auditing techniques and pro-
cedures, but I see no particular evidence that any revolutionary change is needed 
in the standards. 
Our free-enterprise system w i l l be hampered and the tradition of opportunity 
for all w i l l be affected, i f the accounting firms decide only to perform audit 
services for "safe" clients. A relatively new enterprise wi th a first-time registra-
tion statement is frequently of greater risk for an auditor than an established 
business. The new enterprise is more likely to result i n failure or disillusioned 
investors. However, the public interest may not best be served if auditors are 
forced to avoid such risks. The auditor should be able to perform a professional 
service for these entitles i n a proper manner without being subjected to the 
threat of a lawsuit whenever one of them fails. 
As to whether legislation is desirable with respect to putting greater penalties 
on misleading the duly appointed auditors of a company, many factors are 
involved. I would not advocate such legislation at this time, but something 
needs to be done to protect the auditor, who all too frequently is left "holding 
the bag" as a result of management misconduct. 
Auditors are well aware that fraud can occur. They are also concerned 
about the possibility of fraud being so material as to have a significant effect 
on the financial statements upon which they are reporting. O n the other hand, 
the accounting profession must not permit itself to be destroyed by assuming 
responsibilities or accepting a role that cannot be successfully fulfilled. 
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Appendix A 
Extract from Statement on Auditing Standards No. 1, 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (1973) 
110 Responsibilities and Functions of the Independent Auditor 
Detection of Fraud 
.05 In making the ordinary examination, the independent auditor is aware 
of the possibility that fraud may exist. Financial statements may be misstated 
as the result of defalcations and similar irregularities, or deliberate misrepresenta-
tion by management, or both. The auditor recognizes that fraud, if sufficiently 
material, may affect his opinion on the financial statements, and his examina-
tion, made in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards, gives con-
sideration to this possibility. However, the ordinary examination directed to the 
expression of an opinion on financial statements is not primarily or specifically 
designed, and cannot be relied upon, to disclose defalcations and other similar 
irregularities, although their discovery may result. Similarly, although the 
discovery of deliberate misrepresentation by management is usually more closely 
associated with the objective of the ordinary examination, such examination 
cannot be relied upon to assure its discovery. The responsibility of the inde-
pendent auditor for failure to detect fraud (which responsibility differs as to 
clients and others) arises only when such failure clearly results from failure to 
comply with generally accepted auditing standards. 
.06 Reliance for the prevention and detection of fraud should be placed 
principally upon an adequate accounting system with appropriate internal con-
trol. The well-established practice of the independent auditor of evaluating the 
adequacy and effectiveness of the system of internal control by testing the 
accounting records and related data and by relying on such evaluation for the 
selection and t iming of his other auditing procedures has generally proved 
sufficient for making an adequate examination. If an objective of an independent 
auditor's examination were the discovery of all fraud, he would have to extend 
his work to a point where its cost would be prohibitive. Even then he could 
not give assurance that all types of fraud had been detected, or that none existed, 
because items such as unrecorded transactions, forgeries, and collusive fraud 
would not necessarily be uncovered. Acordingly, it is generally recognized that 
good internal control and fidelity bonds provide protection more economically 
and effectively. In the case of fidelity bonds, protection is afforded not only by 
the indemnification for discovered defalcations but also by the possible deterrent 
effect upon employees; the presence of fidelity bonds, however, should not affect 
the scope of the auditor's examination. 
.07 When an independent auditor's examination leading to an opinion on 
financial statements discloses specific circumstances that make h i m suspect that 
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fraud may exist, he should decide whether the fraud, if i n fact it should exist, 
might be of such magnitude as to affect his opinion on the financial statements. 
If the independent auditor believes that fraud so material as to affect his opinion 
may have occurred, he should reach an understanding with the proper repre-
sentatives of the client as to whether the auditor or the client, subject to the 
auditor's review, is to make the investigation necessary to determine whether 
fraud has i n fact occurred, and, i f so, the amount thereof. If, on the other hand, 
the independent auditor concludes that any such fraud could not be so material 
as to affect his opinion, he should refer the matter to the proper representatives 
of the client with the recommendation that it be pursued to a conclusion. For 
example, frauds involving " lapping" accounts receivable collections, or frauds 
involving overstatements of inventory, could be material, while those involving 
peculations from a small imprest fund would normally be of little significance 
because the operation and size of the fund tend to establish a limitation. 
.08 The subsequent discovery that fraud existed during the period covered 
by the independent auditor's examination does not of itself indicate negligence 
on his part. H e is not an insurer or guarantor; i f his examination was made with 
due professional ski l l and care i n accordance with generally accepted auditing 
standards, he has fulfilled all of the obligations implicit i n his undertaking. 
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Appendix B 
Extract from R. K. Mautz and Hussein A . Sharaf, 
The Philosophy of Auditing, American Accounting Association, 1961 
Chapter 6—Due Audit Care, pp. 139-140 
Summary. In this chapter we have tried to establish a concept of due audit 
care as the basis for judging the responsibility of independent auditors i n the 
performance of their professional duties. This concept is based on an assumed 
prudent practitioner and the knowledge, skil l , caution, and responsiveness that 
could be expected from h i m under the circumstances at issue. The usefulness 
of such a concept seems clear. If it can be developed, it w i l l give to all concerned 
with the subject a more explicit statement than is now available i n the literature. 
The difficulty of formulating such a concept is closely related to the problem 
of irregularity detection. There are some irregularities which should be discovered 
in any standard examination; the obligation of discovering certain other irregu-
larities would be so onerous a burden as to be unbearable. Between these ex-
tremes are perhaps innumerable cases varying from one extreme to the other. 
We are unable to find i n the characteristics of irregularities themselves any 
significant clues which permit a precise statement of audit responsibility for 
detection. This leads us naturally and inevitably to consideration of the legal 
doctrine of a prudent man and its application to auditing. 
It must be recognized that a concept of due audit care, founded on the 
legal concept of a prudent man acting reasonably with average knowledge and 
average judgment i n the specific circumstances, cannot give us objective advance 
answers to the question of responsibility i n any given case. W e feel it does give 
a useful criterion to the auditor himself and to those who must judge the quality 
of his work, a criterion which w i l l increase i n usefulness as experience sharpens 
and strengthens the concept itself. 
W e also believe that a statement indicating the extent of responsibility 
accepted can be formulated i n a manner that w i l l make its usefulness apparent, 
both to practitioners i n their daily affairs and to the profession as an indication 
of acceptance of its just and fair responsibilities. L ike development of the concept 
of due audit care, this may take some time, but it is a worthy endeavor and w i l l 
repay the effort. As a beginning, we suggest the following summary. It w i l l be 
apparent to the careful reader that its component ideas have been borrowed from 
a variety of sources. 
Independent auditors should accept responsibility for the discovery and 
disclosure of those irregularities which the exercise of due audit care by a 
prudent practitioner would normally uncover. A prudent practitioner is assumed 
to have a knowledge of the philosophy and practice of auditing, to have the 
degree of training, experience, and skill common to the average independent 
auditor, to have the ability to recognize indications or irregularities, and to keep 
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abreast of developments in the perpetration and detection of irregularities. Due 
audit care requires the auditor to acquaint himself with the company under 
examination, its method of operation and any significant practices peculiar to it 
or the industry of which it is a part, to review the method of internal control 
operating i n the company under examination by inquiry and such other methods 
as are desirable, to obtain any knowledge readily available which is pertinent 
to the accounting and financial problems of the company under examination, 
to be responsive to unusual events and unfamiliar circumstances, to persist unti l 
he has eliminated from his own mind any reasonable doubts he may have about 
the existence of material irregularities, and to exercise caution in instructing his 
assistants and reviewing their work. 
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